

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date 5/8/84

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. _____		
2. _____		
3. _____		
4. _____		
5. _____		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	



35% -

*Confirmed persons meant nothing -
Percentages on TEMPEST under
Program Elements - \$ figures
represent that percentage of the
COMSEC total. (Just as I thought.)*

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

☆ GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

CONFIDENTIAL**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional) Countermeasures Macro Resource Data Study				
FROM: [Redacted] CIA Focal Point Officer [Redacted] Building		EXTENSION [Redacted]	NO. DATE 13 April 1984	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/PPG	4/16/84		[Signature]	Attached is the original of our initial Macro Resource Data Study input to the Interagency Group/Countermeasures.
2. DD/P&M	4/16/84	4/16	[Signature]	
3. DD/S	17 APR 1984	4/17	[Signature]	
4. D/S	17 APR 1984	18 APR 1984	[Signature]	
5. c/Pol Br/PPG				With your approval, I will run it by [Redacted] Office of the Comptroller, and then forward it to [Redacted] at the Intelligence Community Staff/Counterintelligence Staff.
6. c/PPG				
7.				I've made 15 copies and will distribute them appropriately to the various CIA Focal Point Officers so they'll know how their final product looks.
8.				
9.				It is my understanding, based on conversations on 11 April with Al Petit, SECOM Staff, and with [Redacted] Security Staff, that the Department of Energy and [Redacted] have decided not to provide any data to [Redacted]. Furthermore, [Redacted] says that the Treasury Department has declined to provide data unless the Attorney General first grants them permission.
10.				
11.				[Redacted]
12.				
13. [Redacted]				[Redacted]
14. [Redacted]				
15.				5-6: Per [Redacted] on 4/30/84, OK'd release of MACRO report. I have forwarded it to IC Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~*Released 30 Apr, forwarded
1 May 1984*MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
Interagency Group/CountermeasuresATTENTION:

FROM:

Central Intelligence Agency
Focal Point OfficerSUBJECT: Countermeasures Macro Resource Data Study

REFERENCES

- A. D/ICS-83-0776 dated 15 December 1983,
same subject
- B. D/ICS-84-0768 dated 2 February 1984, same
general subject

1. Forwarded herewith is the initial Central Intelligence Agency response to the Interagency Group/Countermeasures tasking on the Countermeasures Macro Resource Data Study. The individual Terms of Reference (TOR) are presented in the order outlined in Reference B. Explanatory remarks are included, keyed to each TOR.

° A. COMSECNo additional comments ° B. TEMPEST

Where cited, these dollar figures
represent 35 percent of the total figures
reflected in the COMSEC data.

OS 4 0840~~SECRET~~

SECRET° C. TSCM

It is re-emphasized that Physical Security costs are 40 percent of the total Agency TSCM figures, and that they are reported separately with the TSCM data. Please note that the 40 percent attributable to physical security is double-counted in the Physical Security TOR response and is clearly identified there. [REDACTED]

It should be noted that the TSCM TOR response does not call out FY 83 funds for the DCI Security Committee (SECOM.) Those funds, in the amount of [REDACTED] were included in the Agency's Office of Security budget. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

° D. PERSONNEL SECURITY

This material has been edited to remove internal Agency data not relevant to the purposes of this Study. [REDACTED]

° E. PHYSICAL SECURITY

The Security Equipment Program costs identified here are being double-counted, as noted above under the TSCM response. [REDACTED]

° F. INFORMATION SECURITY

This TOR has been slightly edited to remove internal Agency data not relevant to the Study. The substance of the submission and its eight attachments remain unchanged.

[REDACTED]

° G. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

Industrial Security costs for the Office of Logistics Security Staff and the Industrial Security Branch/Physical Security Division/Office of Security have been included here. Industrial security costs for National Programs are not included because they are not incurred on Agency-funded activities. [REDACTED]

SECRET

SECRET° H. PORT SECURITY

The Central Intelligence Agency exercises no Port Security responsibilities and will not be responding to this TOR.

25X1

° I. SPACE WARNING MECHANISMS

Agency resources for Space Warning Mechanisms are all expended within the Directorate for Intelligence.

25X1

2. All Agency components responding to the Study requirements have attempted to reflect accurately the dollar and personnel resources expended or programmed for the three years which the Study covers. The figures for FY 83 are relatively firm, given the vagaries of estimating actual dollar costs when factored against the guidance provided in the TOR documents themselves. The FY 84 allocations have not yet been fully expended, so it is impossible to say just what the actual FY 84 figures will be. We are even more in the dark about FY 85 because Agency budget reviews are still underway and our final authorization figures are not yet known. We are, quite frankly, not sanguine that the results of our Study efforts are at all meaningful as a MACRO Management tool.

25X1

3. Central Intelligence Agency data concerning Computer Security is now being gathered and will be provided in accordance with the Study schedule.

25X1

4. Questions concerning this matter may be referred to

25X1

SECRET

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TEMPEST

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TECHNICAL SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES

~~Secret~~

It is impossible to accurately reflect the true TSCM costs, because the Technical Security Divisions budget is in fact used not only to provide TSCM services, but to provide physical security equipment, support and services throughout the world.

PROGRAM: Technical Security Countermeasures (TSCM) is a major program of the CIA Office of Security. The program resides in the Technical Security Division, which is responsible for the budget preparation, management and accomplishment of the agency TSCM mission. The operating budget is initiated by TSD and based on a five year projection cycle. The budget is reviewed within the division, presented to the Office of Security for review and ranking against other office requirements. Following this exercise it becomes a part of the overall Office of Security presentation to the Deputy Director for Administration. The various TSCM programs of the budget are again ranked at the DDA level prior to presentation to the Agency's Executive Committee for final formulation and ultimate presentation to the Office of Management and Budget.

The principal action/decision points are the Deputy Director Physical Technical and Area Security, Director of Security, Deputy Director of Administration, Comptroller*, and the Director of Central Intelligence. At each of these levels the program is reviewed, analyzed, and prioritized. Determinations are made as to the relevance of the program and the expenditures of resources both monetary and manpower in relationship to the responsibility for protection of agency facilities both foreign and domestic. During all of the above activities programs such as physical security, computer security, communications security and operational security are taken into account.

* It should be noted that the Comptroller is an Action Officer for the Executive Committee. He is not a Decision Point.

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PERSONNEL SECURITY

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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

PHYSICAL SECURITY

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

INFORMATION SECURITY

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Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

PORT SECURITY

The Central Intelligence Agency has no input.

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